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An Illusory Right to Appeal: 
Substantial Constitutional 
Questions at the New York Court 
of Appeals 
 
Meredith R. Miller* 
 
Introduction 
 
The jurisdiction of the New York Court of Appeals has long 
been shrouded in mystery. When the court dismisses an 
appeal, it provides a boilerplate, one-sentence decretal entry, 
which gives the litigants little, if any, meaningful indication of 
the court‟s reasons for dismissal. In February 2010, however, 
the world received a rare glimpse into the court‟s jurisdiction 
when, in Kachalsky v. Cacace,1 Judge Robert Smith dissented 
from the court‟s sua sponte dismissal of the appeal. 
Kachalsky involved an appeal questioning whether a state 
law prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons is consistent 
with the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The court dismissed the appeal for failure to raise a 
“substantial constitutional question.”2 Judge Smith dissented 
from the dismissal and voted to retain the appeal, arguing that 
the court was using the requirement of “substantiality” to 
invoke discretion it did not have on an appeal as of right.3 
The court‟s civil jurisdiction generally covers two types of 
cases: (1) those it hears “as of right” pursuant to Civil Practice 
Law Rules (CPLR) 5601; and (2) those for which it has granted 
permission to appeal pursuant to CPLR 5602. In Kachalsky, 
Judge Smith opined that the definition of “substantiality” had 
 
  *  Associate Professor of Law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law 
Center. I am grateful to Tanya Freeman and Syeda Ahmad for superb 
research assistance. 
1. 925 N.E.2d 80 (N.Y. 2010). 
2. Id. at 80. 
3. Id. 
1
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become “so flexible” that it, in effect, conferred on the court 
“discretion comparable to that we have in deciding whether to 
grant permission to appeal under CPLR 5602.”4 
In Kachalsky, Judge Smith pointed to a problematic policy. 
Through the requirement of “substantiality,” the New York 
Court of Appeals is granting itself discretion to determine 
whether to hear certain appeals that ought to be “as of right.” 
The justification for the requirement of “substantiality” is to 
prevent the creativity of counsel in contriving constitutional 
questions to gain the right to appeal. This Article argues that 
this concern is overstated and, in any event, existing 
limitations on appealability and reviewability serve to hinder 
counsel from inventing frivolous constitutional questions for 
the sake of an appeal. Moreover, an expansion of existing limits 
on reviewability could further militate against such abuses. 
As the court‟s policy presently stands, an appeal as of right 
does not lie if the constitutional question is not directly 
involved in the decision from which the appeal is taken. In 
addition, issues that have not been preserved in the courts 
below are not reviewable by the New York Court of Appeals. 
Finally, in some instances, the court will only review the 
constitutional question and none of the other issues in the case. 
This Article argues that, in all appeals “as of right” based on a 
constitutional question, the court‟s review should be limited to 
the constitutional question raised. 
Thus, this Article proposes elimination of the 
“substantiality” requirement. The existing limits on 
appealability and reviewability, as well as proposed, expanded 
limits, serve to prevent counsel from manufacturing frivolous 
constitutional issues for an appeal. The court‟s exercise of 
discretion is not warranted and the current requirement of 
“substantiality” effectively renders the right to appeal on 
constitutional grounds an illusory one. 
 
I.  An Overview of the Court‟s Civil Jurisdiction 
 
The civil jurisdiction of the New York Court of Appeals 
generally includes two types of appeals: (1) those that it hears 
 
4. Id. 
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“as of right”;5 and (2) those where it has granted leave.6 The 
most common appeals as of right are either premised upon a 
double dissent at the New York Supreme Court, Appellate 
Division,7 or a substantial constitutional question.8 Appeals as 
of right on constitutional grounds are discussed in depth in 
Section II. 
Where an aggrieved litigant does not have an appeal as of 
right, the appeal may be heard by permission of the appellate 
division or the Court of Appeals.9 When a motion for leave is 
made to the Court of Appeals, it requires the vote of two judges 
to be granted.10 The judges assess typical certiorari factors, 
such as whether the question of law is “novel or of public 
importance, [or] present[s] a conflict with prior decisions of 
[the] court, or involve[s] a conflict among the departments of 
the Appellate Division.”11 The court, therefore, has wide 
latitude to determine its civil docket. Indeed, in 2009, it 
granted permission to appeal in only 7.2 percent of the 1,070 
civil motions for leave.12 
 
II.  Appeals as of Right on Constitutional Grounds 
 
The New York State Constitution13 and CPLR 5601(b)14 
 
5. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5601 (McKinney 2010). 
6. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5602. 
7. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5601(a). 
8. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5601(b). 
9. See generally N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5602. 
10. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5602(a). 
11. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 500.22(b)(4) (2008); see also 8 
MARK DAVIES ET AL., NEW YORK CIVIL APPELLATE PRACTICE § 15:5 (2010); id. § 
15:3. 
12. STUART M. COHEN, ANNUAL REPORT OF CLERK OF THE COURT TO THE 
JUDGES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 6 (2009), 
available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/news/annrpt/AnnRpt2009.PDF. 
The Court denied 74.2% of civil motions for leave and dismissed 18.6% for 
jurisdictional defects. 
13. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3(b)(1) and (2) provides: 
 
 b. Appeals to the court of appeals may be taken in the 
classes of cases hereafter enumerated in this section; 
. . . . 
 In civil cases and proceedings as follows: 
3
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authorize an appeal as of right to the Court of Appeals on 
constitutional grounds.15 This type of appeal is either: (1) from 
a final determination of the appellate division where a 
constitutional question is directly involved; or (2) directly from 
a final determination of a court of original instance where the 
only question involved is the constitutionality of a state or 
federal statute (a “direct appeal”).16 
When the appeal is from an appellate division judgment, it 
is not required that the constitutional question challenge the 
validity of a statute.17 On such an appeal from the appellate 
 
 (1) As of right, from a judgment or order entered upon 
the decision of an appellate division of the supreme court 
which finally determines an action or special proceeding 
wherein is directly involved the construction of the 
constitution of the state or of the United States, or where 
one or more of the justices of the appellate division dissents 
from the decision of the court, or where the judgment or 
order is one of reversal or modification. 
 (2) As of right, from a judgment or order of a court of 
record of original jurisdiction which finally determines an 
action or special proceeding where the only question 
involved on the appeal is the validity of a statutory 
provision of the state or of the United States under the 
constitution of the state or of the United States; and on any 
such appeal only the constitutional question shall be 
considered and determined by the court. 
 
14. Tracking the language of the state constitution, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5601 
provides in pertinent part: 
 
 (b) Constitutional  grounds.  An  appeal may be taken to 
the court of appeals as of right: 
     1. from an order of the appellate division which finally 
determines an action where there is directly involved the  
construction  of  the constitution of the state or of the 
United States; and 
     2. from a judgment of a court of record of original 
instance which finally determines an action where the only  
question  involved  on  the appeal  is  the validity of a 
statutory provision of the state or of the United States 
under the constitution of  the  state  or  of  the  United 
States. 
 
15. ARTHUR KARGER, POWERS OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS § 7:1, 
at 219-20 (3d ed. 2005). 
16. Id. 
17. Id. § 7:2, at 222; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5601(b)(1). 
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division, the Court of Appeals will consider all questions 
properly within its jurisdiction, even those that do not raise 
constitutional challenges.18 On a direct appeal from a court of 
original instance, however, the constitutional question must 
challenge the validity of a statute, and the court will consider 
only that question on the appeal.19 
In neither of these instances does the New York State 
Constitution or the CPLR expressly require that the 
constitutional question involved be “substantial.” Nevertheless, 
whether the appeal is taken from the appellate division or is a 
direct appeal, the Court of Appeals requires that the 
constitutional question be a “substantial” one; otherwise, it will 
not be heard on the merits. The origin of the substantiality 
requirement is a judicial gloss, and while it has not been traced 
back to an exact public pronouncement, dismissals for failure 
to raise a “substantial constitutional question” appear in 
decretal entries as early as the 1930s.20 Arthur Karger‟s 
authoritative treatise on the court‟s jurisdiction notes that the 
limitation is “firmly established.”21 
Explaining the justification for the requirement of 
substantiality, Karger provides: 
 
It is an obviously necessary safeguard against 
abuse of the right to appeal on constitutional 
questions, for otherwise the right to appeal 
would turn on the ingenuity of counsel in 
advancing arguments on constitutional issues, 
howsoever fanciful they might be.22 
 
The standard of “substantiality,” however, is nowhere 
defined in New York law and “can mean different things to 
different people.”23 Consistent with its justification, 
substantiality has been described as requiring the 
 
18. KARGER, supra note 15, § 7:2, at 223. 
19. Id. at 222 (citing N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3(b)(2)). 
20. See, e.g., Wynkoop Hallenback Crawford Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 
268 N.Y. 108 (1935); Karsten Dairies v. Baldwin, 269 N.Y. 566 (1935). 
21. KARGER, supra note 15, § 7:5, at 226. 
22. Id. 
23. DAVIES ET AL., NEW YORK CIVIL APPELLATE PRACTICE § 15:4. 
5
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constitutional question to “appear to have colorable merit and 
not to be advanced solely or primarily as the predicate for 
appeal as of right.”24 In addressing what constitutes a 
“substantial” constitutional question, Karger writes: 
 
The standard of substantiality cannot, of course, 
be defined with mechanical precision. Whether a 
particular constitutional issue is sufficiently 
substantial to warrant an appeal as of right is, 
generally speaking, rather a matter of judgment, 
to be determined on the facts of the individual 
case.25 
 
In defining substantiality, Karger references the United 
States Supreme Court‟s standard for certiorari petitions.26 
Another, significant limitation on the appealability of the 
constitutional question is that it must be “directly involved” in 
the order from which the appeal is taken. This requirement is 
explicitly stated in New York Constitution, article VI, section 
3(b), and CPLR 5601(b). Direct involvement is a strict 
requirement, and it has been understood to require that the 
constitutional question is “necessarily involved” in deciding the 
case.27 That is, there cannot be another, non-constitutional 
ground that independently supports the determination from 
which the appeal is taken.28 
If one of the jurisdictional predicates for an appeal as of 
right pursuant to CPLR 5601 is not present, the appeal is 
subject to dismissal upon motion or by the court sua sponte.29 
When, on its own motion, the court dismisses an appeal as of 
right which is purportedly on constitutional grounds, the 
 
24. 9 JACK B. WEINSTEIN, HAROLD L. KORN & ARTHUR R. MILLER, NEW 
YORK CIVIL PRACTICE: CPLR ¶ 5601.09 (2d ed. 2005). 
25. KARGER, supra note 15, § 7:5, at 226. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. § 7:8, at 230. 
28. Id. For direct appeals, remember, the only question involved can be 
the constitutional challenge of a statute. Further, the clear implication is 
“that [the question] shall have been „not only directly and necessarily 
involved in the decision of the case.‟” Id. 
29. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 500.10 (2008). 
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Court‟s decretal entry routinely, simply states: “Appeal 
dismissed, without costs, by the Court of Appeals, sua sponte, 
upon the ground that no substantial constitutional question is 
directly involved.”30 Ordinarily, no further information is 
provided concerning the dismissal of the appeal. 
 
III.  Kachalsky v. Cacace: The Illusory Appeal as of Right on 
Constitutional Grounds 
 
This standardized decretal entry usually fails to provide 
any meaningful suggestion of the court‟s reasons for dismissal. 
However, in February 2010, in Kachalsky,31 insight was gained 
into the mystifying inner workings of the court. In that case, 
the court dismissed the appeal sua sponte for failure to raise a 
substantial constitutional question. Judge Robert Smith 
dissented from the dismissal and voted to retain the appeal. In 
so doing, Judge Smith challenged the other judges to consider 
the proper contours of the substantiality requirement. 
Petitioner Alan Kachalsky, a solo practitioner, wanted to 
carry a concealed pistol for self-protection but knew it would be 
a “long shot to get authorization.”32 When Judge Susan Cacace 
denied Kachalsky‟s application, he commenced an article 78 
proceeding to review the determination.33 The New York 
Appellate Division, Second Department, confirmed the 
determination and denied the petition, holding petitioner 
“failed to demonstrate „proper cause‟ for the issuance of a „full 
carry‟ permit” as required by the New York Penal Law.34 
Further, it held that “respondent‟s determination was not 
arbitrary or capricious.”35 The terse opinion did not address 
any of petitioner‟s constitutional claims. 
Apparently, however, on appeal to the New York Court of 
 
30. See, e.g., Disimone v. Adler, 14 N.Y.3d 764 (2010); Sieger v. Sieger, 
14 N.Y.3d 750 (2010); W. N.Y. Land Conservancy, Inc. v. Cullen, 13 N.Y.3d 
904 (2009). 
31. Kachalsky v. Cacace, 925 N.E.2d 80 (N.Y. 2010). 
32. Joel Stashenko, Smith Takes Judges to Task for Failure to Find 
Substantial Constitutional Issue in Gun Case, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 4, 2010. 
33. Kachalsky v. Cacace, 884 N.Y.S.2d 877 (App. Div. 2009). 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
7
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Appeals, petitioner argued that the Penal Law violates the 
Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.36 
Namely, petitioner raised the following two issues: “(1) whether 
the Second Amendment limits the powers of the states, as well 
as of the federal government; and (2) whether a prohibition on 
carrying concealed weapons without a showing of proper cause 
is consistent with the Second Amendment.”37 
In a rare written dissent38 from the court‟s dismissal of the 
appeal, Judge Smith stated that the issues raised were 
substantial.39 Judge Smith reasoned: 
 
The first [issue] is of such great substance, and 
current importance, that the Supreme Court has 
granted certiorari to consider it [McDonald v. 
City of Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 48 (2009)]. The second 
issue, in light of [District of Columbia v. Heller, 
128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008)], unquestionably presents 
fair ground for litigation. On neither issue could 
petitioner‟s case, by any remote stretch, be called 
frivolous or fanciful.40 
 
Judge Smith opined that the definition of “substantial” had 
become “so flexible that it confers on us, in effect, discretion 
comparable to that we have in deciding whether to grant 
permission to appeal under CPLR 5602.”41 
In so arguing, Judge Smith questioned whether the court 
has such wide latitude in determining whether to retain an 
appeal on constitutional grounds. He recognized that, if it had 
discretion concerning whether to retain the appeal, there was 
“a perfectly reasonable argument” for the Court to wait until 
the United States Supreme Court decided McDonald.42 
However, given that the appeal was as of right, Judge Smith 
questioned whether the Court of Appeals had such discretion. 
 
36. Kachalsky, 925 N.E.2d at 81-82. 
37. Id. at 81. 
38. Stashenko, supra note 32. 
39. Kachalsky, 925 N.E.2d at 81. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 80. 
42. Id. at 81. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss2/2
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He wrote, “I would not quarrel with that exercise of discretion, 
if I thought the discretion existed. I think, however, that 
petitioner has a constitutional right to have us hear this 
appeal, and that‟s all there is to it.”43 
 
IV.  Elimination of the Requirement of “Substantiality” 
 
In his Kachalsky dissent, Judge Smith raises a serious 
concern. The court is using the requirement of “substantiality” 
to invoke discretion that it should not, by definition, have on 
appeals as of right. This practice is reinforced by Karger‟s 
authoritative treatise, which explains the requirement of 
substantiality as akin to the standard for certiorari at the 
United States Supreme Court.44 Through the requirement of 
substantiality, the Court of Appeals has some measure of 
discretion whether to retain an appeal on constitutional 
grounds and, therefore, this type of appeal “as of right” is not 
really “as of right.” 
Neither the CPLR nor the New York State Constitution 
requires that the constitutional question be “substantial.”45 If 
the New York Legislature intended for the Court of Appeals to 
have discretion on these appeals: (1) it would not have 
described them as appeals “as of right” and, further, (2) there 
would be no distinction between appeals as of right pursuant to 
CPLR 5601 and motions for leave to appeal pursuant to CPLR 
5602. 
This invocation of discretion is problematic because it may 
serve to deprive an aggrieved litigant of a proper appeal. In 
addition, it is a way for the court to avoid addressing the merits 
of difficult, politically charged issues. Indeed, the issue in 
Kachalsky involved the highly politicized debate about the 
scope of the federal constitutional right to bear arms. Further, 
for example, other recent dismissals of appeals as of right 
included constitutional issues affecting sex offender 
 
43. Id. 
44. KARGER, supra note 15, § 7:5, at 226. 
45. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3(b)(1)-(2); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 
5601(b)(1)-(2) (McKinney 2010). 
9
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commitment,46 state executive power,47 public school standards 
and enrollment policies,48 marriage and domestic partnership 
laws,49 public university funding,50 the state budget,51 and 
judicial pay.52 
The stated justification for invoking a requirement of 
“substantiality” is to prevent counsel from crafting frivolous 
constitutional claims to manufacture an appeal to the Court of 
Appeals.53 This concern, however, is exaggerated. Likewise, 
other existing and proposed safeguards could prevent frivolous 
constitutional arguments without the court invoking discretion 
that it should not have on these appeals. 
From January 1990 to May 2010, New York‟s highest court 
dismissed sua sponte 197 civil appeals “upon the ground that 
 
46. Martin v. Goord, 845 N.Y.S.2d 524 (App. Div. 2007) (whether 
Department of Correctional Services‟ standardization of sex offender 
programs and resulting policy changes violated the ex post facto clause of 
State or Federal Constitution), appeal dismissed, 883 N.E.2d 365 (N.Y. 2008). 
47. McKinney v. Comm‟r of N.Y. State Dep‟t of Health, 840 N.Y.S.2d 6 
(App. Div. 2007) (whether law authorizing State Department of Health to 
reorganize hospitals and nursing homes unconstitutionally delegated 
legislative authority to the executive branch), appeal dismissed, 874 N.E.2d 
735 (N.Y. 2007). 
48. Paynter v. State, 735 N.Y.S.2d 337 (App. Div. 2001) (whether 
reliance on standardized test scores violates constitutional right to a sound 
education), appeal dismissed, 771 N.E.2d 832 (N.Y. 2002) (Judge George 
Bundy Smith and Judge Ciparick dissenting and voting to retain 
jurisdiction). 
49. Slattery v. City of New York, 697 N.Y.S.2d 603 (App. Div. 1999) 
(whether New York City exceeded its authority in enacting domestic 
partnership law), appeal dismissed, 727 N.E.2d 1253 (N.Y. 2000). 
50. Weinbaum v. Cuomo, 631 N.Y.S.2d 825 (App. Div. 1995) (whether 
disparate funding of CUNY and SUNY violated equal protection clause), 
appeal dismissed, 664 N.E.2d 506 (N.Y. 1996) (Judge George Bundy Smith 
dissented and voted to retain jurisdiction “on the ground that the allegations 
of racial discrimination in the funding of City University of New York 
[CUNY] and State University of New York [SUNY] present substantial 
constitutional questions and support an appeal as of right . . . .”). 
51. Schulz v. Silver, 629 N.Y.S.2d 316 (App. Div. 1995) (whether, absent 
the passage of a budget and an emergency situation, any appropriations or 
expenditures by the State Legislature are unconstitutional), appeal 
dismissed, 658 N.E.2d 216 (N.Y. 1995). 
52. Davis v. Rosenblatt, 559 N.Y.S.2d 401 (App. Div. 1990) (whether 
disparity in wages among judges of various counties violates equal protection 
clause of State and Federal Constitutions), appeal dismissed, Higgins v. 
Rosenblatt, 567 N.E.2d 976 (N.Y. 1991). 
53. KARGER, supra note 15, § 7:5, at 226. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss2/2
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no substantial constitutional question is directly involved.”54 
This is an average of less than ten such dismissals per year—
with some years seeing as few as one or two such dismissals 
and other years having more than twenty. Of those appeals, it 
is difficult to discern from the decretal entry which were 
dismissed for lack of substantiality and which were dismissed 
because the constitutional question was not directly involved. 
Nevertheless, a survey was undertaken of all 197 decisions on 
the orders appealed from and dismissed during this twenty-
year time frame. Of these decisions, a very insignificant 
number (roughly forty-three)55 addressed a constitutional issue. 
 
54. The quoted language is the wording of the boilerplate decretal entry 
the Court uses to dismiss constitutional appeals sua sponte.  Using these key 
words, in May 2010, the following search query was performed in the 
Westlaw database “NY-CS”: “COURT (HIGH) & DISMISSED /S APPEAL /S 
“SUA SPONTE” /S “SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION” /S 
INVOLVED & DATE (AFT 1989).” This search was, therefore, limited to sua 
sponte dismissals. 
  During that same time, based upon the official reporter‟s summaries, the 
Court appears to have retained roughly seventy-eight appeals on 
constitutional grounds. In May 2010, the following search query was 
performed in the Westlaw database “NY-ORCS”: “CO (HIGH) AND (APPEAL 
/2 “CONSTITIONAL GROUNDS”) AND DATE (AFT 1989) % DISMISSED.” 
This search includes constitutional question appeals that were not the 
subject of a sua sponte dismissal inquiry and were, thus, decided on the 
merits. There are, however, some limits to this search. First, it does not 
include constitutional question appeals that were placed on sua sponte 
dismissal track but were retained by the Court. Second, the search does not 
include appeals on constitutional grounds that were not put on sua sponte 
dismissal track but still did not proceed to disposition on the merits (e.g., 
dismissals for failure to timely perfect). It is believed that the number of such 
cases, if there are any, is very small. Also, the search is based on decision 
dates and not filing dates; therefore, the results may include cases filed 
before 1990 but decided after. Again, however, this would be a very small 
number of decisions. 
  My gratitude extends to Stuart Cohen, Frances Murray and James 
Costello for helping craft the search and informing me of its limitations. 
55. See Madireddy v. Madireddy, 886 N.Y.S.2d 495 (App. Div. 2009), 
appeal dismissed, 925 N.E.2d 96 (N.Y. 2010); W. N.Y. Land Conservancy, Inc. 
v. Cullen, 886 N.Y.S.2d 303 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 922 N.E.2d 880 
(N.Y. 2009); Attea v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 883 N.Y.S.2d 610 (App. Div.), 
appeal dismissed, 918 N.E.2d 955 (N.Y. 2009); Potter v. Town Bd. of Aurora, 
875 N.Y.S.2d 414 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 910 N.E.2d 1006 (N.Y. 2009); 
Mill River Club, Inc. v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 873 N.Y.S.2d 167 
(App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 910 N.E.2d 428 (N.Y. 2009); In re Bishop, 863 
N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 2008), appeal dismissed, 906 N.E.2d 1079 (N.Y. 2009); 
Friendly Car Wash Main Street, Inc. v. Comm‟r of Labor, No. 504440, 2009 
11
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WL 105107 (N.Y. App. Div. Jan. 5, 2009), appeal dismissed, 906 N.E.2d 1065 
(N.Y. 2009); In re Land Master Montg I, LLC 863 N.Y.S.2d 692 (App. Div.), 
appeal dismissed, 900 N.E.2d 551 (N.Y. 2008); Syndicated Commc'n Venture 
Partners IV, LP v. BayStar Capital, L.P., 859 N.Y.S.2d 125 (App. Div.), 
appeal dismissed, 896 N.E.2d 85 (N.Y. 2008); Junk'n Doughnuts Inc. v. Dep't 
of Consumer Affairs of New York, 855 N.Y.S.2d 59 (App. Div.), appeal 
dismissed, 892 N.E.2d 856 (N.Y. 2008); Kosich v. State Dept. of Health, 854 
N.Y.S.2d 551 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 892 N.E.2d 856 (N.Y. 2008); 
Leyse v. Domino's Pizza LLC, 853 N.Y.S.2d 38 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 
892 N.E.2d 395 (N.Y. 2008); Marino v. Kahn, 855 N.Y.S.2d 560 (App. Div.), 
appeal dismissed, 892 N.E.2d 395 (N.Y. 2008); Kessler v. Hevesi,  846 
N.Y.S.2d 56 (App. Div. 2007), appeal dismissed, 889 N.E.2d 489 (N.Y. 2008); 
Graham v. Dunkley, 852 N.Y.S.2d 169 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 889 
N.E.2d 484 (N.Y. 2008); Davenport v. Stein, 845 N.Y.S.2d 253(App. Div. 
2007), appeal dismissed, 886 N.E.2d 789 (N.Y. 2008); Martin v. Goord, 845 
N.Y.S.2d 524 (App. Div. 2007), appeal dismissed, 883 N.E.2d 365 (N.Y. 2008); 
Love‟M Sheltering, Inc. v. County of Suffolk,  824 N.Y.S.2d 98 (App. Div.  
2006), appeal dismissed, 881 N.E.2d 1198 (N.Y. 2008); Street Vendor Project 
v. City of New York, 841 N.Y.S.2d 79 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 879 
N.E.2d 168 (N.Y. 2007); St. Joseph Hosp. of Cheetowaga. v. Novello, 840 
N.Y.S.2d 263 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 878 N.E.2d 606 (N.Y. 2007); 
DiFrancesco v. County of Rockland, 839 N.Y.S.2d 105 (App. Div.), appeal 
dismissed, 877 N.E.2d 296 (N.Y. 2007); McKinney v. Comm‟r of N.Y. State 
Dep‟t of Health, 840 N.Y.S.2d 6 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 874 N.E.2d 735 
(N.Y. 2007); Festa v. N.Y.C. Dep‟t of Consumer Affairs, 37 A.D.3d 343 (1st 
Dep‟t), appeal dismissed, 9 N.Y.3d 858 (2007); In re Estate of Rose BB, 35 
A.D.3d 1044 (3d Dep‟t 2006), appeal dismissed, 8 N.Y.3d 936 (2007); Kaplan 
v. Julian, 35 A.D.3d 1291 (4th Dep‟t 2006), appeal dismissed, 8 N.Y.3d 395 
(2007); Cobos v. Dennison, 34 A.D.3d 1325 (4th Dep‟t 2006), appeal 
dismissed, 8 N.Y.3d 851 (2007); In re Guardianship of Chantel Nicole R., 34 
A.D.3d 99 (1st Dep‟t 2006), appeal dismissed, 8 N.Y.3d 840 (2007); Landsman 
v. Village of Hancock, 296 A.D.2d 728 (3d Dep‟t), appeal dismissed, 99 N.Y.2d 
529 (2002); Paynter v. Stone, 290 A.D.2d 95 (4th Dep‟t 2001), appeal 
dismissed, 98 N.Y.2d 644 (Smith, J. and Ciparick, J. dissent and vote to 
retain jurisdiction); DiRose v. N.Y. State Dep‟t of Corr. Servs., 276 A.D. 842 
(3d Dep‟t 2000), appeal dismissed, 96 N.Y.2d 850 (2001); MacFarlane v. 
Village of Scotia, 241 A.D.2d 574 (3d Dep‟t 1997), appeal dismissed, 95 
N.Y.2d 930 (2000); Santiago v. Bristol, 273 A.D.2d 813 (4th Dep‟t), appeal 
dismissed, 95 N.Y.2d 827 (2000); Slattery v. City of New York, 266 A.D.2d 24 
(1st Dep‟t 1999), appeal dismissed, 94 N.Y.2d 897 (2000); Children‟s Vill. v. 
Greenburgh Eleven Teachers‟ Union Fed'n of Teachers, Local 1532, 685 
N.Y.S.2d 754 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 716 N.E.2d 178  (N.Y. 1999); 
Helgans v. Plurad, 680 N.Y.S.2d 648 (App. Div. 1998), appeal dismissed, 711 
N.E.2d 639 (N.Y. 1999); Gulotta v. State, 645 N.Y.S.2d 41 (App. Div.), appeal 
dismissed, 674 N.E.2d 332 (N.Y. 1996); Weinbaum v. Cuomo, 631 N.Y.S.2d 
825 (App. Div. 1995), appeal dismissed, 664 N.E.2d 506 (N.Y. 1996); Kraebel 
v. N.Y.C. Dep‟t of Fin., 629 N.Y.S.2d 42 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 658 
N.E.2d 216 (N.Y. 1995); Schulz v. Silver, 629 N.Y.S.2d 316 (App. Div.), appeal 
dismissed, 658 N.E.2d 216 (N.Y. 1995); Penfield Tax Protest Grp. v. Yancey, 
621 N.Y.S.2d 256 (App. Div. 1994), appeal dismissed, 650 N.E.2d 1318 (N.Y. 
1995); In re Rowe, 595 N.Y.S.2d 499 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 625 
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Further, of those roughly forty-three decisions that did 
address a constitutional issue, most also raised non-
constitutional issues, suggesting that some of the appeals were 
dismissed on the ground that the constitutional question was 
not directly involved. Because the court publicly issues only the 
one-sentence decretal, it is difficult to know just how many of 
these appeals were dismissed for lack of substantiality—but 
even if all of them were dismissed on this basis, it only 
amounts to about forty-three appeals in the course of twenty 
years. This is hardly a floodgate of work for the court. 
Further, the roughly 154 remaining decisions from which 
an appeal was taken did not address or did not involve a 
discernible constitutional issue. This would appear to suggest 
that the constitutional questions raised on these appeals were 
either not raised below or not directly involved (after all, if the 
decision below does not mention any constitutional issues, the 
decision very likely rests on other, independent, non-
constitutional grounds). 
Given the elusive nature of the court‟s one-sentence 
decretal, it is admittedly a very limited gauge to review the 
decisions from which appeals were taken to assess whether the 
appellants raised a substantial constitutional issue in the 
courts below. Indeed, the decision on the appellate division 
order appealed from in Kachalsky did not address any 
constitutional issues.56 Nevertheless, the decisions are a 
window into what types of issues are being raised and 
addressed in the courts before the appeal is taken to the Court 
of Appeals. 
That said, it simply does not appear that the Court of 
Appeals would be overburdened if the “substantiality” 
requirement were eliminated. Certainly, one might argue that 
the reason that there are only 197 such dismissals in the past 
twenty years is because of the substantiality requirement; in 
other words, it could be argued that there is an insignificant 
number of these appeals because the hurdle of substantiality 
 
N.E.2d 587 (N.Y. 1993); Duffy v. Wetzler, 579 N.Y.S.2d 684 (App. Div.), 
appeal dismissed, 592 N.E.2d 798 (1992); Davis v. Rosenblatt, 599 N.Y.S.2d 
401 (App. Div. 1990), appeal dismissed, Higgens v. Rosenblatt, 567 N.E.2d 
976 (N.Y. 1991). 
56. Kachalsky v. Cacace, 884 N.Y.S.2d 877 (App. Div. 2009). 
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dissuades litigants from attempting an appeal as of right. 
However, the requirement of substantiality could actually have 
the opposite effect of incentivizing more frivolous appeals. To 
the extent that “substantiality” imbues the court with 
discretion, and most attorneys lack a solid understanding of 
the intricacies of the court‟s jurisdiction, they are arguably 
more likely to file an appeal as of right—after all, they might 
perceive that there is a slight chance the court will exercise its 
discretion and retain the appeal. “Substantiality” is a standard, 
which Karger observes is “not defined with mechanical 
precision.”57 The uncertainty of such a vast grey area, combined 
with a general ignorance of the technicalities of the court‟s 
jurisdiction, is likely to lead to more appeals, not less.58 
There are intellectually honest ways for the court to 
prevent frivolous appeals on invented constitutional grounds 
without invoking discretion that it is not technically granted by 
statute or New York State Constitution. First and foremost, the 
requirement that the constitutional question is “directly 
involved” is expressly stated in both the CPLR and the State 
Constitution.59 As discussed, this strict requirement appears to 
dispose of many, if not most, of the purported appeals as of 
right on constitutional grounds. Of course, given that the 
court‟s decretal entry does not decode whether the dismissal is 
for lack of substantiality or because the question is not directly 
involved, it is admittedly difficult to make any hard and fast 
pronouncements, other than the law and the public would 
benefit from less cryptic entries from the New York Court of 
Appeals. 
Second, to the extent there is concern that litigants will 
manufacture constitutional issues to get the appeal heard “as 
of right,” limitations on reviewability serve to stem this abuse. 
Significantly, the court‟s power of review is limited to those 
 
57. KARGER, supra note 15, § 7:5, at 226. 
58. Further, one might argue that, if very few of the decisions appeal 
from actually addressed a constitutional issue, perhaps this is evidence that a 
constitutional issue is being manufactured for the purpose of bringing an 
appeal. This argument is irrelevant because, if the issue is only first raised 
on appeal, it is not preserved and, therefore, not reviewable by the Court. See 
infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. 
59. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3(b)(1); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5601(b)(1). 
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issues that have been preserved in the courts below.60 That is, 
the question must have been raised before appeal to the court. 
Therefore, a litigant could not devise a frivolous constitutional 
argument and raise it for the first time on appeal solely for the 
purpose of obtaining an appeal as of right. Preservation rules 
apply to appeals as of right.61 “[U]nless the constitutional 
question was initially properly raised in the court of first 
instance, it will not be reviewable by the [New York] Court of 
Appeals.”62 To be sure, the court has stated that “it is better . . . 
not to resolve constitutional questions unaddressed by the 
lower courts.”63 
In addition, on a direct appeal from a court of original 
jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals will consider only the 
constitutional question.64 Therefore, it would not make sense to 
manufacture a frivolous constitutional claim to create an 
appeal, because the court will not address the other, non-
constitutional issues raised on the appeal. 
To further safeguard against the stated concerns that 
purport to justify the “substantiality requirement,” this 
limitation on the court‟s review should also be extended to 
appeals from appellate division judgments. Currently, on 
appeals as of right from the appellate division, the court will 
consider all questions properly within its jurisdiction, even 
those that do not raise constitutional challenges.65 However, if 
the court only reviewed the constitutional question, it would 
negate any incentive for a litigant to invent a flimsy 
constitutional argument just to gain an appeal. This would 
address the concerns that purport to justify the substantiality 
requirement without furnishing the court with discretion that 
makes an appeal “as of right” illusory. 
 
60. KARGER, supra note 15, § 14:1, at 495. 
61. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 11, § 15:5; id. § 15:3. 
62. KARGER, supra note 15, § 17:5, at 599. 
63. Saratoga Cnty. Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, 100 N.Y.2d 
801, 825 (2003) (stating that is was better for the Court not to review a 
constitutional question not discussed at trial court and only mentioned in 
passing by the Appellate Division); see also KARGER, supra note 15, § 14:1, at 
498. 
64. KARGER, supra note 15, § 7:2, at 222 (citing N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 
3(b)(2)). 
65. Id. § 7:2, at 223. 
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Conclusion 
 
The Court of Appeals‟ practice requiring that an appeal as 
of right pursuant to CPLR 5601(b) raise a “substantial” 
constitutional question is not loyal to the explicit text of the 
CPLR or the New York State Constitution. Indeed, to the 
extent that the requirement invokes discretion for the court to 
determine which appeals on constitutional grounds to retain, it 
subverts the basic structure of both the CPLR and the State 
Constitution, which contemplate appeals as of right as distinct 
from appeals that necessitate permission from the court. 
The stated justification for the requirement of 
“substantiality” is unsound and redundant of other existing 
limitations on appealability and reviewability—namely, the 
requirement that the constitutional question be directly 
involved in deciding the case and the requirement that the 
question be preserved for the court‟s review. Moreover, the 
court will only review the constitutional challenges on a direct 
appeal. If the court expanded this reviewability limitation to 
appeals from the appellate division, it would significantly 
eliminate the incentive for an aggrieved litigant to 
manufacture a frivolous constitutional question in order to gain 
the right to appeal—because the constitutional question is the 
only issue the court would address on the appeal. 
In sum, the judicially created policy of requiring 
“substantiality” should be eliminated. There are existing and 
sensible safeguards that do not require the court to furnish 
itself with discretion that is not conferred by statute or 
constitution. 
 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss2/2
